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The influenza A (H7N9) subtype remains a public health problem in China affecting individuals in contact 
with live poultry, particularly at live bird markets. Despite enhanced surveillance and biosecurity 
at LBMs H7N9 viruses are now more widespread in China. This study aims to quantify the temporal 
relationship between poultry surveillance results and the onset of human H7N9 infections during 
2013–2017 and to estimate risk factors associated with geographical risk of H7N9 human infections in 
counties in Southeast China. Our results suggest that poultry surveillance data can potentially be used 
as early warning indicators for human H7N9 notifications. Furthermore, we found that human H7N9 
incidence at county-level was significantly associated with the presence of wholesale LBMs, the density 
of retail LBMs, the presence of poultry virological positives, poultry movements from high-risk areas, as 
well as chicken population density and human population density. The results of this study can influence 
the current AI H7N9 control program by supporting the integration of poultry surveillance data with 
human H7N9 notifications as an early warning of the timing and areas at risk for human infection. The 
findings also highlight areas in China where monitoring of poultry movement and poultry infections 
could be prioritized.
Since the emergence in early 2013 of a low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H7N9 virus1, there have been six 
epidemic waves causing about 1,600 human infections in 29 provinces and municipalities in mainland China2. 
During the fifth epidemic wave starting in October 2016, the geographic range of H7N9 human cases expanded 
and more human cases were reported than any previous wave3. In February 2017, strains of the 2013 LPAI H7N9 
virus isolated from chickens in Guangdong province mutated to become highly pathogenic avian influenza 
(HPAI) H7N9 in poultry and rapidly spread to other provinces of China4,5. The rapid evolution, increased path-
ogenicity and transmissibility of HPAI H7N9 viruses in mammalian models, together with their extended host 
range, may have increased the threat to public health and the poultry industry6,7.
Live bird markets (LBMs) remain the main source of H7N9 virus spreading among poultry, and from poultry 
to humans8. Recognizing the role of LBMs in the exposure and dissemination of H7N9 viruses, in Feb 2017, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA) of China established the “1110 policy”, which includes manda-
tory daily market cleaning activities, disinfection, market closure once a month, and no overnight market poultry 
storage. This policy was followed in July 2017, by the implementation of the National Vaccination Program in 
the poultry sector through the adoption of a bivalent H5/H7 inactivated vaccine. While this vaccine has largely 
been effective at controlling H7N9 virus circulation among both chicken and humans5,7,9, the virus is still being 
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occasionally detected by the national animal disease surveillance system10. Therefore, a better understanding of 
the determinants of exposure is necessary to complement sanitary measures such as vaccination and enhanced 
LBM biosecurity.
The available literature indicates that the primary risk factor for human H7N9 infection in China is exposure 
to LBMs, and that intervention at this stage of the live poultry market chain is the most effective prevention 
measure11–17. Poultry-to-human transmission is intensified at LBMs, hence as a short term response, LBM closure 
should be rapidly implemented in areas where the virus is identified in either poultry or humans18,19. However, 
this may not be favorable to poultry enterprises or individual households due to the associated financial costs. 
Reactive closure of LBMs may facilitate further dissemination through the opening of unregistered LBMs or 
illegal poultry movements20.
Surveillance and monitoring of avian influenza within the poultry market chain (i.e. farms, live bird mar-
kets and slaughter houses) generates epidemiological evidence on affected species, geographical sources of infec-
tion and the role of modifiable risk factors on disease transmission21. Animal health authorities in China have 
been prompt at identifying the presence of the H7N9 virus within the live poultry market chain and controlling 
infection transmission at the source since the emergency. The control of H7N9 in chickens through vaccination 
explains the sudden decrease in the number of human H7N9 infections since October 20177,9. Little is known 
about the relative timing of infections in people and poultry, which should peaks in transmission in poultry 
and precede human cases. Poultry surveillance results could provide an early warning for the likely timing and 
location of human H7N9 infections, however, this requires further evaluation. Furthermore, the role of poultry 
movements from the originally affected area in Eastern China in disseminating H7N9 infection throughout the 
country is yet to be quantified.
Several ecological spatial studies aiming at identifying risk factors of H7N9 human cases have been under-
taken in China3,22–26, and distribution of H7N9 risks were mapped in these studies. Of these, two studies by Fuller 
et al. and Gilbert et al. attempted to map the suitability for H7N9 human infections in Asian regions. LBM density 
was demonstrated to be significantly associated with the presence of human H7N9 infections3,23,26. Human pop-
ulation density and density of both intensively and extensively raised chickens were also found to be predictors 
of H7N9 presence26. A previous study also found there was a major shift of risk factors from anthropological (i.e. 
LBM and human population density) towards poultry related variables (i.e. poultry density and chicken-to-duck 
ratio) linked to human H7N9 cases over time3. Other studies also evaluated the role of pig density, distance to 
freeway, distance to national highway, landcover, temperature and relative humidity, etc.22,25. However, none of 
these studies looked at the effect of more proximal factors such as poultry surveillance results and live chicken 
movement in explaining the geographical variation of human H7N9 infections.
In this study, we quantified the temporal relationship between the onset of human H7N9 infections during 
2013–2017 and poultry serological and virological surveillance results. Then we estimated the relative risk of 
H7N9 human incidence in counties in Southeast China by assessing the relationship between human infections 
as the outcome and poultry virological surveillance results, live chicken movements and recognized demographic 
risk factors as explanatory variables.
Results
The distribution of human H7N9 notifications and poultry surveillance positives from Mar 2013- Aug 2017 is 
shown in Fig. 1. A total of 1,514 human H7N9 infections and 324 poultry virological positives were geocoded at 
least to county level. The majority of the H7N9 virological positive samples (88.3%, 286 out of 324) were collected 
from LBMs. A total of 1,181 counties from 14 provinces and municipalities in southeast China were included in 
this study (Fig. 1); about 93% (1408 out of 1514) of reported human H7N9 infections and 89.5% (290 out of 324) 
of reported H7N9 virological positive samples fell in these counties.
Social network analysis of chicken movements. In total, we analyzed live chicken movement data from 
four wholesale LBMs and four live poultry trading platforms from Jiangsu, Anhui and Shanghai from January to 
July 2014 (Table S1). Chicken movements from live poultry trading platforms tend to involve long-distance and 
inter-provincial transportation of chickens, while chicken movements from wholesale LBMs are mostly confined 
to local areas or neighboring provinces (Fig. S1). The full extent of the 2-mode network (LBMs and chicken 
source/destination counties) is presented in Supplementary Fig. S2. The results of this analysis revealed that there 
was a giant weakly connected component comprising eight wholesale LBMs and 249 chicken source/destination 
counties. These 249 counties were located mainly in Jiangsu, Anhui and Shanghai, extending to neighboring 
provinces Henan, Hubei and Shandong, and further to the south, including Guangdong. The degree centralities of 
all the county nodes ranged from one to six and the geographic distribution of degree centrality is demonstrated 
in Fig. S3. The counties with the highest degree centrality were Jintan, Changzhou, Yangzhou in Jiangsu province 
(degree = 6); and Jiangyan, Lishui, Taixin, Shuyang, Zhenjiang and Nanjing from Jiangsu province, and Huzhou 
from Zhejiang province and Wuhu from Anhui province (degree = 5).
Temporal associations between human H7N9 notifications and poultry H7N9 surveillance 
data. Results from the time-series analysis indicate that there is a significant temporal relationship between 
human H7N9 notifications and poultry surveillance results. Our results indicate that the peak of poultry H7N9 
serological positives is followed by human H7N9 infections with a two-month lag, poultry H7N9 virological 
positives are followed by human H7N9 infections with a one-month lag (Fig. 2). In addition, poultry serological 
H7N9 positives are followed by poultry H7N9 virological positives with a one-month lag (Fig. 2).
Spatial autocorrelation (Moran’s I). Incidence of human H7N9 infections was significantly spatially clus-
tered, as indicated by a positive Moran’s I value (0.152) that was statistically significant at the 0.05 level (Table S2).
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Bayesian spatial conditional autoregressive model of human H7N9 infections. The presence 
of wholesale LBMs (Coef. = 0.33, 95% CrI: 0.08~0.56) in the county and the density of retail markets (Coef. = 
0.88, 95% CrI: 0.52~1.24) were positively and significantly associated with the human H7N9 incidence (Table 1). 
Human H7N9 incidence was positively associated with the presence of poultry virological positives (Coef. = 
0.56, 95% CrI: 0.27~0.84) and the connectivity of counties with respect to poultry movements (Coef. = 0.81, 
95% CrI: 0.46~1.18; Coef. = 0.89, 95% CrI: 0.23~1.58). While human H7N9 incidence was positively associated 
with increasing chicken population density (Coef. = 0.33, 95% CrI: 0.01~0.65; Coef. = 0.91, 95% CrI: 0.44~1.38), 
Figure 1. Spatial distribution of human H7N9 infections (red dots) and poultry virological surveillance 
positives (blue dots) from 2013 to 2017. Dots represent either geographic locations of the H7N9 human 
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Cross-correlogram of Sero-Prevalence and Viro-Prevalence
Figure 2. Cross correlation of H7N9 poultry serological prevalence and virological prevalence relate to H7N9 
human cases (A,B), and cross correlation of H7N9 serological prevalence relate to virological prevalence (C). 
The correlation of sero-prevalence at Lag −2 is approximately 0.49, and the correlation of viro-prevalence 
at Lag −1 is approximately 0.37. The correlations are significant because the values are greater than [2/ (Sqrt 
(n-|lag | ))), n = 48].
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human H7N9 incidence was inversely proportional to human population density (Coef. = −0.70, 95% CrI: 
−1.00~−0.40; Coef. = −1.12, 95% CrI: −1.50~−0.74).
A map of adjusted relative risks (RRs) of human H7N9 incidence by county (Fig. 3) shows that high risk areas 
of human H7N9 infection were spatially clustered in southeastern China, extending from the Yangtze River delta 
near Shanghai to the Pearl River delta near Guangzhou and covering most areas of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shanghai, 
Anhui, Fujian, Guangdong and Hunan provinces. Additional hot spots for human H7N9 infections were found 
in the northern region of Guangxi, eastern region of Hubei province, northern and southern region of Jiangxi, 
northern region of Beijing, and the northern region of Hebei province (Fig. 3). The map of the spatially structured 
random effects demonstrates evidence of clustering around the Yangtze River delta area (Fig. S4).
Discussion
This study extends current knowledge3,22–26 about the spatiotemporal epidemiology of human H7N9 infections 
in a number of ways. Firstly, using the most complete data on human H7N9 infections and poultry LBM surveil-
lance from 2013–2017, our spatial analyses mapped the spatial distribution of human H7N9 infections and its 
relationship with poultry serological and virological surveillance results. Second, our human H7N9 relative risk 
map displayed the distribution of high-risk areas associated with poultry infection status in the county, presence 
of wholesale LBMs, density of retail LBMs, human population density, chicken density and poultry movement 
network in the county.
Our analysis identified temporal lags between human H7N9 notifications and poultry surveillance recorded 
during 2013 to 2017. From examining the temporal relationship between human H7N9 infections and poultry 
H7N9 surveillance results, we detected a one/two-month temporal lag between the onset of human H7N9 infec-
tions and poultry virological/serological surveillance results. These temporal lags may be explained by, firstly, 
the sensitivity of serological surveillance for H7N9 in poultry is much higher than virological surveillance, and 
LPAI virus or its genome can be detected in an individual bird for only a few days due to the short period of virus 
shedding, whereas antibodies elicited by LPAI virus are often present for the entire production life of the infected 
poultry27,28. Meanwhile, due to low sensitivity, virological positives will be more likely to be detected when the 
concentration of virus has built up to a more detectable level most likely through the live poultry market chain, i.e. 
from farms then going through traders, wholesale markets and retail markets. Besides, our results demonstrated 
that most of the H7N9 virological positive samples were collected in LBMs10, which is consistent with the consen-
sus that the primary risk factor for human H7N9 infections in China is exposure to LBMs11–17. These findings are 
also consistent with those from our spatial models of human H7N9 incidence, suggesting that the county-level 
incidence of human H7N9 infections is positively associated with the presence of poultry virological positives 
in the county. Together these findings have important operational implications for anticipating human H7N9 
infections based on current routine LBM H7N9 surveillance in poultry.
Previous studies indicated that LBM density and the number of LBMs were important factors for explaining 
the risk of H7N9 human infections3,13,22,23,25,26,29. In our analysis, both the presence of wholesale LBMs and density 
of retail LBMs were positively associated with higher relative risk of human H7N9 infections. Wholesale LBMs 
bring together live birds from large catchment areas and birds are commonly traded to retail LBMs30,31; this results 
in market networks with numerous trade connections. Higher densities of markets may exacerbate that risk 
and explain the strong spatial correlation with suitability for H7N9 infection26. Closing LBMs appears to be an 
effective approach for eradicating or reducing H7N9 infections in humans32. However, a recent study presented 
Variables at county level Category Coefficient, posterior mean (95%CrI)
Present of wholesale LBMs no Ref.
yes 0.33 (0.08~0.56)
Retail LBMs density (markets/100 km2) Low density (<1) Ref.
Medium density (1–3) 0.16 (−0.13~0.44)
High density (>3) 0.88 (0.52~1.24)
Present of poultry virological positive no Ref.
yes 0.56 (0.27~0.84)
Population density (people/km2) 0–200 Ref.
201–600 −0.70 (−1.00~−0.40)
>600 −1.12 (−1.50~−0.74)
Chicken density (birds/km2) <500 Ref.
500–3000 0.33 (0.01~0.65)
>3000 0.91 (0.44~1.38)




Precision of spatial random effect 0.22 (0.18~0.27)
Table 1. Results of spatial conditional autoregressive model of human H7N9 human incidence during 2013–2017. 
(CrI Credible Interval, a variable was considered significant if CrI excluded 0).
5Scientific RepoRtS |        (2020) 10:10372  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-66359-1
www.nature.com/scientificreportswww.nature.com/scientificreports/
evidence that the closure of LBMs in early waves of H7N9 influenza had resulted in expansion of H7N9 infection 
to uninfected areas20. This implies closing LBMs is a long-term strategy that needs to be further evaluated. Our 
recent meta-analysis identified biosecurity measures that have been effective for controlling AI viruses at LBMs 
include smaller market size, selling single poultry species and separating different species, mandatory monthly 
rest days and bans on keeping live birds overnight, and sourcing poultry from local areas33. These identified char-
acteristics of LBMs allow us to better target control efforts.
Furthermore, in our model we included estimates of live chicken movement from areas originally affected 
areas by H7N9 in Southeast China, which allowed us to evaluate the effect of live chicken movement from the 
primary high-risk area on the overall distribution of human H7N9 infections from 2013 to 2017. Our results indi-
cate a positive relationship between human H7N9 incidence and poultry movement estimates (degree centrality) 
from our CAR model. A previous study of poultry market chains in South China also reported that LBMs where 
HPAIV H5N1 was isolated were associated with higher degree centrality34. Poultry network studies in Vietnam 
and South China revealed that live poultry traders tend to link poultry sources of similar infection status34,35. 
These findings suggest that poultry movements from the originally affected area in east China provinces may 
continue to play a role in disseminating H7N9 virus throughout China. This further demonstrates the importance 
of evaluating live poultry movement and trading practices to develop appropriate and targeted surveillance rec-
ommendations for active H7N9 surveillance program.
After adjusting for poultry marketing system variables (presence of wholesale LBMs and density of retail 
LBMs) and spatial autocorrelation, our results indicated that human population density was negatively associated 
with the human H7N9 incidence while chicken density was positively associated with human H7N9 incidence. 
This can partly be explained by the known epidemiology of H7N9 in humans in that most human cases are a 
result of animal-to-human transmission, rather than human-to-human transmission. Since most H7N9 cases 
have been reported in large cities where human population density is very high, it may partially due to that the 
surveillance effort to detect H7N9 human cases was much greater in area with high population density and better 
medical facilities22,23. Moreover, higher human population density is usually related to higher biosecurity levels 
in the LBMs in highly dense urbanized areas. Furthermore, existing evidence indicates that H7N9 is more prev-
alent in chickens than in other poultry species3,8,36. Also, while H7N9 can affect other species it is mainly limited 
to chickens due the characteristics of the industry and the marketing system8. Higher chicken density is usually 
related to high chicken production, chicken trading and transportation which may promote transmission of the 
pathogen among poultry and increase the chance of humans acquiring H7N9 infection. Our findings suggest 
that highly connected areas with high chicken density and low human population should be targeted in case the 
Figure 3. Spatial distribution of the relative risks for human H7N9 incidence in counties in southeast 
provinces. Red and bright color indicating a higher risk, blue and darker color indicating a lower risk. The maps 
were created in ArcGIS 10.1 software (©ESRI).
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virus continues to evolve or the efficacy of the vaccine is reduced, or even for the emergence of similar viruses in 
the future.
Moreover, the results of our study demonstrated significant spatial clustering of human H7N9 incidence in the 
study area, which required the development of a geographical model that incorporated spatial autocorrelation in 
order to generate a robust risk map of human H7N9 infection across China. Our human H7N9 relative risk map 
suggests that although H7N9 vaccine for poultry is currently available, continued active surveillance still needs 
to be strengthened for high-risk areas in China. Our results support strengthening LBM and human surveillance 
in Southeast area of China (involving Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui provinces and Shanghai Municipality), coastal 
areas in Fujian and Guangdong provinces, and some inland areas in Hubei, Hunan and Guangxi provinces, as 
well as Beijing Municipality and the Northern area in Hebei province. According to the National Guidelines on 
the Prevention and Control of H7N9 influenza in Poultry in China (2018–2020)37, the current control of H7N9 
infections in poultry in China has relied heavily on wide-scale compulsory preventive vaccination combined with 
biosecurity enhancement in both poultry farms and LBMs, regular surveillance programs, as well as live poultry 
movement control, quarantine and stamping out. The introduction of live poultry from high-risk areas and sites is 
strictly restricted37, however, the delimitation of high risk-areas is unclear. This study attempted a new risk assess-
ment approach and the results provided recommendations to a more targeted risk-based surveillance program, 
as well as new insights into the role of LBMs and poultry movement in China. However, the map of the spatially 
structured random effects demonstrates evidence of clustering around the Yangtze River delta area, suggesting 
that there are other risk factors not included in our spatial models, such as people’s behaviour, or indeed other 
environmental factors that could account for the residual spatial distribution.
The results of this study should be interpreted in light of some limitations. Our analyses were based on 
laboratory-confirmed cases of human H7N9 infections and reported poultry H7N9 virological surveillance 
results, and are therefore subject to reporting bias, especially in areas of China with poor surveillance system cov-
erage. In addition, our data for the distribution of LBMs were obtained from local veterinary departments except 
Shandong and Zhejiang provinces, data for these two provinces were replaced by another dataset clarified in the 
supplementary file, which may bring some reporting bias and uncertainty to the model. Furthermore, our live 
chicken movement data were collected in selected high-risk areas in Southeast provinces in 2014, representing the 
live chicken movements coming from and to the originally affected provinces, which may not reflect the current 
poultry movement situation across the region. The measures of degree centrality used in our model do not repre-
sent a perfect indicator of the “overtime” exposure of countries via movement of poultry from 2013 throughout 
2017, its use in our model is important to consider in the context of the original source of the virus. We recognize 
that the effect of the measures of degree centrality are far from depicting a causal relationship and thus are prone 
to regression dilution bias; however, it is remarkable that despite this limitation we were able to identify a signifi-
cant signal on the role of the poultry movements originating from the initially affected area.
In conclusion, contamination of LBMs with H7N9 is an important determinant of the risk of human H7N9 
incidence in China. Moreover, poultry movement from the original areas of H7N9 emergence may be an impor-
tant driver of the dissemination of H7N9 infections across China, and poultry serological positives and viro-
logical positives can serve as a predictor for human H7N9 infections as well as being a guide for the timing of 
risk management interventions. Highly connected areas with high chicken density and low human population 
should be targeted. It is recommended that regular monitoring of poultry movement and poultry infections at the 
high-risk counties identified in this study will provide essential evidence for the early warning of H7N9 infections 
across China.
Materials and Methods
Human H7N9 infection data and poultry H7N9 surveillance data. We obtained all laboratory-con-
firmed H7N9 human cases reported during Mar 2013 and Aug 2017, from “Situation Updates - Avian Influenza” 
of the World Health Organization (WHO)38 and “Avian Influenza Report” from the Centre for Health Protection 
of the Department of Health of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR)39. Case definitions and 
laboratory testing have been described previously22,40. For each human H7N9 case, information on county of 
residence and date of onset of symptoms was extracted.
For poultry H7N9 infection data, we extracted data on H7N9 poultry surveillance between Mar 2013 and Aug 
2017 from the National H7N9 Surveillance Program. Both poultry serological and virological surveillance results 
are published on the monthly official Veterinary Bulletin released by the Veterinary Bureau of the MARA of 
China10. Since April 2013 Chinese authorities conduct routine active surveillance for H7N9 in poultry through-
out the territory41. The National H7N9 Surveillance Program is an active surveillance system that consists of 
monthly serological and virological surveillance carried out by provincial Centers for Animal Disease Control 
and Prevention (CADCs). The samples were collected by county level CADCs, then the samples will be gathered 
by prefecture level CADCs. Identification of H7N9 infection in poultry involves testing of oropharyngeal and 
cloacal swab samples using RT-PCR or fluorescence RT-PCR and positive results are confirmed by the Harbin 
National Avian Influenza Research Institute. Serological tests against H7 are used to determine whether poultry 
were exposed to an H7 virus, serum samples are tested by hemagglutination inhibition (HI) test. The surveillance 
targets are specified chickens (especially layer, yellow feather broilers and other breeds which have long raising 
cycle), waterfowl (ducks, geese), domestic pigeons and quail, wild birds and environment in high risk areas. The 
scope of surveillance was specified to be all poultry trading markets in China, stalls selling live poultry in farmers 
markets, poultry with certain size, backyard poultry raising farmers, poultry slaughter houses, and habitats of 
migratory birds. Sample collection was done through the national surveillance program performed by provincial 
animal CDCs on a monthly basis. All reported H7N9 human cases and poultry virological surveillance positives 
were then geo-referenced and linked to a county level map of China.
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Data on live chicken movement. A cross-sectional survey was conducted from June to July in 2014 tar-
geting the live meat chicken trade in six counties located in Jiangsu (Lishui, Jintan, Jiangyan) and Anhui (Feixi, 
Quanjiao and Chaohu) provinces. These counties were selected based on the findings from a previous study8 
conducted during the H7N9 emergency response, which demonstrated that connectivity of chicken sources was 
highest in these six counties. In addition, one county in Shanghai municipality (Fengxian) was added, which was 
the location of the first H7N9 human case reported in 2013. Shanghai municipality is also adjacent to Jiangsu 
province where human H7N9 and H5N1 infections were demonstrated to be co-distributed42. An initial sample 
size of one or two wholesale LBMs (subject to actual numbers of LBMs in a county) in the seven high-risk coun-
ties were included; typically, there are a total of 1 to 2 wholesale LBMs in each county. Information on live poultry 
movements was obtained from poultry movement certificates available at wholesale LBMs and live poultry trad-
ing platforms in the selected counties. Live poultry trading platforms are intermediary poultry trade venues that 
operate between wholesalers and farmers. For instance, a wholesaler places an order at the trading platform for 
5,000 meat chicken and the trading platform will contact farmers who raise meat chickens. Farmers with meat 
chicken in stock will then deliver poultry to the trading platform and the wholesaler poultry trader will then pur-
chase the chicken at the trading platform and move them to the wholesale LBM. All available chicken movement 
certificates in the trading locations surveyed were recorded from January 2014 to July 2014. This dataset records 
half-year chicken movements and is representative of the extent of live chicken movement within and beyond 
that region.
Sociodemographic factors. A set of sociodemographic risk factors was considered in the analysis includ-
ing the presence of wholesale LBMs in each county (a binary variable representing presence/absence), and the 
density of retail LBMs (markets/100 km2), human population density (people/km2) and chicken density (birds/
km2). All factors were compiled at the county level. All data sources are summarized in Table 2; the source of 
LBMs is described in the Supplementary Information 1.
Social network analysis. To describe the connectivity pattern within the chicken movement dataset con-
sisting of records of paired trading events between a particular LBM and the county they trade with (termed 
as “trade county”), we used social network analysis (SNA), as described previously34. We summarized network 
connectivity using degree centrality of the 2-mode binary network (LBM nodes vs trade county nodes). The 
degree represents the absolute number of unique links of a given node and it is important for describing the levels 
of connectivity between different actors within a network, thereby allowing identification of the most influential 
spreaders within a network43.
cross correlation analysis. To assess the temporal relationship between the onset of human H7N9 infec-
tions and poultry serological and virological surveillance results, we used a time-series cross-correlation analysis 
to calculate the temporal lags in months between the outcome (human infections) and the surveillance indica-
tor (poultry infections). The dataset was structured by month because the reports of surveillance results were 
aggregated by month10. In order to mitigate potential missing detection and report in early 2013 and potential 
reporting bias in late 2017 after the adoption of H7 vaccination since July 2017, we only used human and poultry 
H7N9 infection data from July 2013 to June 2017. From each time-lagged correlation, only the lag with the high-
est correlation value was selected for the analysis. Usually, a correlation is significant when the absolute value is 
greater than 2/sqrt(n-|k | ), where n is the number of observations and k is the lag.
Analysis of spatial variation in human H7N9 infections at county level. To assess whether there 
was spatial autocorrelation in the observed pattern of human H7N9 infections in the study area we used the 
Global Moran’s Index (Moran’s I), a measure of spatial autocorrelation for spatially aggregated data. We used the 
incidence rate of human H7N9 infections per 1,000 (i.e. estimated by dividing the observed number of human 
cases by the total human population in the county and multiplied by 1,000) for estimation of Moran’s I. Moran’s 
I is positive when nearby areas tend to be similar, negative when they tend to be dissimilar, and approximately 
zero when attribute values are arranged randomly in space44. The Moran’s I value and a Z-score (evaluating the 
significance of the index) were estimated using ArcGIS 10.1 (©ESRI).
Bayesian spatial conditional autoregressive model (CAR). A Bayesian framework was used to con-
struct a Poisson regression model of the observed incidence of human H7N9 infections in each county using the 
OpenBUGS software 3.2.3 rev 101245. The model included all of the explanatory variables described above and 
a spatially structured random effect. The mathematical notation for the model is provided in the Supplementary 
Variables at county level Sources
Presence of wholesale LBMs China Animal Health and Epidemiology Centre (see supplementary information)
Number of retail LBMs China Animal Health and Epidemiology Centre (see supplementary information)
Poultry virological positives Monthly Veterinary Bulletin from MARA
Network centrality Primary investigation in Jun-Jul 2014
Human population density 2010 Census
Chicken density Robinson et al. 200747
Table 2. Risk factor variables used in the analysis.
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Information 2. It assumed that the observed counts of H7N9 human infections in the county (from 1 to 1181) 
followed a Poisson distribution.
The spatially structured random effect was modelled using a conditional autoregressive (CAR) prior struc-
ture46. This approach uses an adjacency weights matrix to determine spatial relationships between counties. If two 
counties share a border, it was assumed the weight = 1 and if they do not the weight = 0. The adjacency matrix 
was constructed using the “Adjacency for WinBUGS tools” in ArcGIS45. A flat prior distribution was specified for 
the intercept, whereas a normal non-informative prior distribution was used for the coefficients (with a mean = 
0 and a precision = 0.001). The priors for the precision of spatially structured random effects were specified using 
non-informative gamma distributions (0.5, 0.0005). The OpenBugs code is in Supplementary Information 3.
The first 1,000 iterations were run as a burn-in period and discarded. Subsequent sets of 20,000 iterations 
were run and examined for convergence. Convergence was determined by visual inspection of posterior density 
and history plots and by examining autocorrelation plots of model parameters. Convergence occurred at approx-
imately 100,000 iterations for each model. Another 20,000 values from the posterior distributions of the model 
parameters were stored and summarized for the analysis. Statistical significance was indicated by 95% credible 
intervals (95% CrI), a variable was considered significant if CrI excluded 0.
Choropleth maps were created using the ArcGIS software to visualize the geographical distribution of crude 
incidence for the 1181 counties in the study area. The posterior means of the CAR random effects obtained from 
the models were also mapped.
Ethics statement. The research proposal leading to the study received ethical approval from the China 
Animal Health and Epidemiology Centre (CAHEC) of MARA China. The research proposal leading to the 
primary data collection of chicken movements received ethics approval from the Behavioral & Social Sciences 
Ethical Review Committee of the University of Queensland (Approval number: 2014001167). There were no 
samples from humans or animals taken as part of our study, and we used secondary information on human infec-
tions and market positivity to H7N9 infection derived from open access websites. All methods were performed in 
accordance with the relevant guidelines and regulations.
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